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### STANUS OF OXCARD

1.*	Origin:
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OXCART is a CHALICE follow-on manned aircraft photographic reconneissance system. OXCART, begun on I September 1959, is an outgrowth of a CHETO feasibility study which was devoted to determining the feasibility of developing a CHALICE follow-on aircraft.

### 2. Hanagement:

CIA is responsible for managing the CKCART program which is being carried out under the joint suspices of the CIA and USAF.

### 3. Description of System:

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								A
.S. ¢	peretions	l site is	envisa <sub>d</sub> o:	l for this	progree.	Aerial	caperes	being
avelo	oped for t	be system						
		<u> </u>						

### 4. Program:

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a. September 1959 to Spring/Surmer 1961:

Development and flight test of the system.

NRO review(s) completed.

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### b. Summer of 1961-1965:

- (1) Operational phase of the program:
  - Utilizing two refuelings, 96% (115 tergets) of the 120 highest and priority tergets (12 Merch 1960 data) can be covered in 15 operational missions, weather permitting.
- (2) The operational life of the ONCART program is dependent on the Soviets ability to detect and intercept the ONCART mireraft with ground to mir mismiles. It is felt that the Soviet capability to intercept the mireraft will improve in the late phase of this period.
- improving performance and perhaps attaining higher altitudes through a weight reduction progress and in some cases by aborter range operational applications from more than one operational site.

### e. 1966-1970:

- (1) Operational phase of the OKCART program on a limited basis:

  Exring this phase, limited application of the OKCART aircraft can
  be employed against special targets primarily in areas where Soviet
  radar and intercept capabilities are known to be week.
- (2) It is anticipated that in this period the satellite photo-reconnaissence especiality will improve and sugment to a large extent manned aircraft photo-reconnaissence systems. Eventually, the satellite photo-reconnaissence system, if successful, will supplant manned aircraft reconnaissence systems as the primary source of photography over denied areas.

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### STATUS OF CORONA

### 1. Origin

The Discoverer series of astellite launchings involves the covert development and operational use of short-lived photographic reconnects ance (CORCHA) and mapping (ARRON) satellites from which a recoverable capsule will be retrieved at a pre-selected open area. Prior to its initiation the development of such a system was started by the Air Force as a part of Weapons System 117L. This phase was cancelled in February 1958; and, Discoverer because the covert reactivation, with a few modifications of a progress already undertaken.

### 2. Messayanun't

Overall management of the project is shared by CIA (DPD) with originally ARFA and now Dr. York's office and with the support and full participation of the U.S. Air Force. Detailed supervision of Lockheed, the systems manager, is performed by the Air Force Dellistic Miseile Division, which is also responsible for the provision of ground facilities. CIA takes the lead in contracting for and in monitoring through LASD the development of the photo payloads and CIA controls the security of the progress.

#### 3. Syperience to date

The Discoverer series consists of twenty nine vehicles of which twenty are photo reconneissance four are sapping and the balance are for cover purposes. As of 1 April there had been ten launches and one abort on pad. Six of the launches achieved orbit, but more had been recovered. There had been seven cemeras launched. Of these three failed of orbit and in the other four malfunctions occurred.

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### 4. Description of System

### The Vehicle

decovery

The vehicle is a two-stage rocket consisting of a THOM first stage and the ACREA second stage. By June of 1960 this system should provide a four day polar orbit.

### CUNCHA KIM ARGON COMOTAS

The COROMA camera is a modified HYAC-1 with 70 mm film. Focal length is 24 inches. By June 1960 it is expected that 7000 feet of film (40 lbc) can be carried for a two-day operation at a planned mititude of 120 miles and a vehicle speed of 27,000 feet per second.

The resultant scale of the photography is about 1:300,000. Expected ground resolution is 25 feet. A sweth of approximately 150 % 1800 % miles should be covered in each pass or about 270,000 square M. Miles. This is a programmed 1,350,000 square M. Hiles per day.

The ARGON camere is a mapping type with 3 inch focal length and 5 inch film. The resultant scale of the topography is approximately 1:4.000,000 Comers format size is 40" X 40" and covers a ground area of approximately 250 X 250 N. Miles. Expected ground resolution is approximately 333 feet. Maximum film load is 4000 feet (42 lbs.). This is sufficient film for four days operation to obtain complete mapping coverage of the earth's land mass with primary exphasis on USSR.

The recovery system consists of separation of the resultry nose consover Alaska followed by retro rocket propelled reentry into the atmosphere and with paraclasts deployment at 50,000 feet with the nominal impact area

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opproximately 250 miles south of Honolulu. Recovery is to be effected by mir ematch by C 119 S backed up by surface ships in an area from just East of Johnson Island to about 550 miles East of the nominal impact point.

### 5. Future Progress

### A. Mirough FX 1962

An extension of the COROBA progress is planned for the spring and summer of 1961. This will consist of several photo recommaissance vehicles and probably one or more mapping payloads.

### B. FY 1962-1970

In intelligence requirement will exist during the balance of the decade for satellite photo-recommulesence of denied areas with ground resolution of 25 feet or better. This conclusion is based on the following assumptions:

- (1) Lacking an international arms agreement there will be a continwing need for photo-intelligence of Soviet Bloc arms development; or
- (2) With such an agreement at some point in the decade there vill be a need of photo intelligence for inspection purposes.
- (3) Although memmed lower eltitude flights, carrying equipment giving better photography, may be carried out, there will be an additional need for gross coverage from satellite photography to fill in the time and area gape of the more sophisticated coverage and to point to areas deserving of closer scrutiny by such systems.

The conclusion stated at the outset seems therefore justified. However, the extent to which recommissence setallites need be flown covertly is by no means clear. It is ressonable to expect that our

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reluctance to orbit cameras openly over denied areas would disappear at once with positive free world support for such setion, or in the event of a Soviet attempt to do so, or with a requirement for this kind of "inspection" in support of an areas agreement, and that one or smother of these events is likely to occur. Since the weight of the evidence appears to support this view, it is assumed for the purpose of this study that CIA will not be engaged in satellite reconnaissance beyond CY 1961.

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